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AQUINAS AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THE
TRADITIONAL ARGUMENT
CHRISTIAN BRUGGER*

INTRODUCTION

The influence of Aquinas on the traditional Catholic philo1
sophical defense of capital punishment is extraordinary. It
would not be extreme to say that the rational plausibility of the
Church's traditional defense depends in large measure on the
soundness of Aquinas' argumentation.

My intention for this

essay is to critique Aquinas' account of the foundations forjustifiable intentional homicide. First, I examine his understanding of
the norm against killing, its scope and the nature of its derivation
from first principles. Aquinas argues that the norm's exceptionlessness extends only to the deliberate killing of the inno-

cent. What then justifies the state in deliberately killing the
guilty? Aquinas puts forward three principal arguments. The
first is drawn from an analogy of the relationship of a part to its
*
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1. A few examples include: J. AERTNYS & C.A. DAMEN, THEOLOGIA
MoRALIs, tom. I, lib. III, tract. V, cap. II, no. 569, at 538-40 (Marietti 1950)
(1845); CHARLES-RENt BILLUART, CuRsus THEOLOGIAE, tom. 12, diss. 10, art. 1,
at 50 (Paris, 1829); Cardinal Cajetan, Commentariesof Thomas Cajetan, Commentary on Q. 64, art. 2, at 69, in THOMAS AQUINAS, OPERA OMNIA, torn. IX (1873);
VICTOR CATHREIN, S.J., PHILOSOPHIA MORALIS IN USUM SCHOLARUM, pars. II, lib.
II, cap. III, thesis XCIX, nos. 638-41, at 468 (Herder & Co., 1932) (1900); FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTION ON HOMICIDE & COMMENTARY ON SUMMA THEO-

LOGIAE IIa-IIae, q. 64 (John P. Doyle trans., Roland J. Teske ed., Mediaeval
Philosophical Texts in Translation No. 34, 1997); A.J.J.F. HAINE, THEOLOGIAE
MoRALIs, tom. I, pars. II, cap. III, q. 130, at 453 (Desclhe 1900); LEONARDO
LESSIus, DE IUSTITIA ET IURE CAETERISQUE VIRTUTIBUS, COMMENTARY ON SUMMA
THEOLOGtAE II-II, q. 47-171 (Paris, 1606);JOHN A. McHUGH, O.P. & CHARLESJ.
CALLAN, O.P., MORAL THEOLOGY. A COMPLETE COURSE, vol. 2, nos. 1820-22, at
100-02 (1958); BENEDICT MERKELBACH, O.P., SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MORALIS,
tom. II, nos. 354-56, at 353-56 (1954); H. NOLDIN, SJ., SUMMA THEOLOGIAE
MoRALts, vol. II, no. 330, at 353-55 (Typis et Sumptibus Fel. Rauch, 1910);
DOMINIC M. PROMMER, O.P., MANUALE THEOLOGIAE MORALIS, tom. II, tract. XI,
q. III, § 2, no. 118, at 108-10 (Herder & Co., 1955); PETRO SCAVINI, THEOLOGIA
MORALIS UNRIERSA, tom. III, tract. VII, disp. II, cap. I, art. I, no. 75, q. 7, at
73-75 (Paris: Jacob Lecoffre ed., 1863); for a more detailed defense of this
assertion see chapters 5 and 6 of my book, CHRISTAN BRUGGER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION (2003).
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corresponding whole, the second on the consequences for
human dignity of committing very grave sin, and the third from
the prerogatives and limits of civil authority. With respect to
each I ask whether the premises, lines of analogy, and conclusions are rationally sound. I conclude that Aquinas' attempts to
give a rational foundation to intentional killing fail, and hence,
that Catholic tradition (indeed Western ethical tradition) has no
sound philosophical ground for arguing that the intentional killing of the guilty is ex objecto (i.e. by virtue of the nature of the
freely chosen object) fundamentally different from the intentional killing of the innocent.
I.

THE FIFTH PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE AND EXCEPTIONS

The moral norm against killing, according to Aquinas, binds
differently for private individuals than it does for public authority. Public authority, as guardian of the welfare of the community, legitimately inflicts harm and death on members who pose a
grave danger to the community's welfare. Private individuals, on
the other hand, may never intentionally harm or kill another,
including in self-defense. 2 In other words, the norm against killing applied to private individuals binds without exception.'
Aquinas states clearly why he thinks intentional killing can be
legitimate for public authority, but he is not so clear why it is
forbidden to private individuals. What he says elsewhere about
the wrongfulness of suicide gives us a clue.
He confronts the following objection: murder (homicidium)
is wrong because it constitutes a terrible injustice; but no one can
do an injustice to himself; therefore suicide is legitimate. Aquinas replies, murder is wrong, not only because it is contrary to
justice, but also because it is opposed to the charity (caritas) we
owe to ourselves. 4 Let's look more closely at his reference to
"charity."
In his respondeo to the same article he says:
To kill oneself is always wrong since everything naturally
loves itself; and to this belongs the fact that everything naturally preserves itself in being, and resists corruptions as
much as it can. Wherefore, killing oneself is contrary to
the inclination of nature, and contrary to charity by which
2. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, q. 64, art. 7, at 1471
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II].
3. Id. at q. 64, art. 3, at 1467-68.
4. Id. at q. 64, art. 3, at 1469 (emphasis added). Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the SUMMA THEOLOGICA are my own.
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every man ought to love himself. Therefore, killing oneself
is always a mortal sin, insofar as it is contrary to the natural
law and contrary to charity.5
Aquinas argues that authentic self-love gives rise to a natural
inclination to preserve ourselves in being and resist harm; and
killing oneself is contrary to both this natural inclination and the
charity from which it arises. Does Aquinas mean that the wrongfulness of suicide, or more precisely, the moral norm singling out
self-killing as always wrong, is derived from our natural inclination? To answer this we need to look more closely at Aquinas'
conception of natural inclinations.
In his famous question on the natural law in the Prima
Secundae Aquinas speaks about natural inclinations in relation to
the principles of practical reason and the natural law. He says
that the first principles of the natural law relate to practical reason as the first demonstrative principles relate to speculative reason. (Practical reason refers here to the reason which underlies
our action; whenever we consider what it would be good to do,
when we consider opportunities open to us, we are engaging in
practical reasoning.) In both cases the principles are self-evident
(per se nota) ("known through themselves").6 What does Aquinas
mean by the term self-evident? He refers to the quality of selfevidence in two ways. A thing is said to be self-evident "in itself'
and "in relation to us." An example of the former is a proposition whose predicate belongs to the intelligibility of its subject,
e.g., "man is a rational being," "tarantulas are large arthropods,"
"car tires are made from vulcanized rubber." One who says
"man," or "tarantulas," or "car tire material" implicitly says "a
rational being," "large arthropods," and "vulcanized rubber."
But it is self-evident "in relation to us" only if we understand the
terms signified by the principle, e.g., "man," "rational being,"
"tarantula," or "arthropod." Self-evident propositions that are
universally known are propositions whose terms are known to all.
Self-evident propositions whose terms are difficult to know are
known only to "the wise." Aquinas distinguishes between the
objective and subjective senses of self-evidence in order to draw
attention to the second type as the type he intends to consider in
his discussion of the principles of practical reason.
It is important to understand that our grasp of self-evident
principles is unmediated. A self-evident principle is known
5.

Id. at q. 64, art. 5, at 1469.
THOMAS AQUIN&S, SUMMA

THEOLOGICA I-II, q. 94, art. 2, at 1009
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947) [here-

6.

inafter SUMMA

THEOLOGICA

1-11].
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"through itself' (per se nota), not through appeal to
a middle
term or through inferential reasoning. When its terms are
understood, its affirmation is immediate, not in the sense of
occurring at once, but rather occurring without appeal to some
more basic set of reasons. So, for example, the first principle of
demonstration, also called the "principle of non-contradiction,"
viz., a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same way,
is universally understood to be true, presuming of course that its
central term-being--is understood. Aquinas says that being is
what first falls under the reason's grasp. We might say it gets
reasoning started. If someone cannot affirm the existence of
being, or distinguish between being and not-being, then reasoning cannot get off the ground. Being, therefore, is the most basic
intelligibility to fall under the mind's knowing. In this sense it is
a "first principle of reason," and although it does not tell us what
to think, it tells us what is most basic to thinking anything, insofar
as an adequate conception of being is necessary in order to think
at all; in this sense it underlies all our thinking.
All this is by way of introducing Aquinas' discussion of practical reason. Just as the concept of being is the most basic concept
of speculative reason, or of demonstration, good is the most basic
intelligibility grasped by practical reason, that which we first

apprehend when we think about choiceworthy possibilities for
action.7 Good, or goods, therefore, are the starting point for
practical reasoning. As the apprehension of being is what is most
basic to thinking at all, our grasp of the concept of good is what is
most basic to acting. Good gets practical reasoning going; it
moves us to act. And just as human reason has a non-inferential
grasp of the first principle of demonstration which singles out
the concept of being, practical reason has a non-inferential,
immediate grasp of the first principles of practical reason which
single out the concept of the good: "since . . . good has the

nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary," basic practical principles are knowable per se, they are affirmed without
appealing to some more basic argumentation or principles.' The
most basic undifferentiated first principle of practical reason,
Aquinas says, is "good is to be done and pursued and evil
avoided."' Just as the first principle of speculative reason does
not tell us what to think, but rather what is most basic to thinking
anything, the first principle of practical reason does not tell us
what to do, but rather what is basic to doing anything at all: in
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id. ("Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum.").
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reasoning practically, it is necessary to think in terms of doing
and pursuing something good and avoiding what is contrary to
good, lest we have no reason to act at all.
This is where the concept of human inclinations arises.
Aquinas says that all those things that practical reason naturally
understands to be good, that is to say, all those things to which
we have a naturalinclination, belong to the first principles of the
natural law as things to be pursued and their contraries to be
avoided.1" The inclinations to which he refers, of course, are
rational inclinations." We naturally affirm the goodness of
human good, not in the sense of intellectually possessing the
knowledge in the form of innate ideas, but rather, when, through
experience, we come in contact with, and begin to understand
the terms singled out by basic practical principles, we immediately affirm those principles as true and the human goods they
specify as good and choice-worthy to pursue without appealing to
any more basic reasoning. The first human good Aquinas identifies is the good of human life, which, he says, corresponds to our
natural inclination to preserve ourselves in being. 2 Human life
is not good because we have a natural inclination to preserve it,
rather we have an inclination to preserve it because human life is
good and we are naturally inclined to recognize it as such.
To return to our question whether the wrongfulness of suicide is derived from our natural inclination to preserve ourselves
in being, we can see now that suicide is wrong, not because of our
inclination, but rather because it is contrary to human good. Aquinas says, "the very fact of being is a good, and so all things desire
to be."'" Desire here arises from our understanding of the good
of human life and the choiceworthiness of actions aimed at its
protection and promotion.1 4 Which returns us to Aquinas'
important term "charity." Recall he said that murder and suicide
are wrong because they are contrary to the charity we owe to our
neighbor and ourselves. 5 The charity that is morally relevant
here is the charity that arises on account of our rational recognition of the goodness of human life. The rational ground for love
therefore is the self-evident recognition of the basic good of
human life; we love, if you will, the good nature God has created:
10.

Id.

11.
12.

Id.
Id.

13.

THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CoNTRA GENrTnILs

bk. 3, pt. 1, ch. 3, no. 4, at

39 (Vernon Bourke trans., Univ. Notre Dame Press 1956) [hereinafter SUMMA
CONTRA GENTILES].

14.
15.

Id. at bk. 3, pt. 1, ch. 3, no. 7, at 39.
SuMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, supra note 2, at q. 64, art. 5, at 1469.
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"In every man, even in a sinner, we ought to love the nature that
God has made." 6
Why then is it always wrong for a private individual to intentionally harm or kill another person? Because the basic good of
human life gives rise to a moral norm which singles out and forbids all actions contrary to it. In other words, human reason has
a natural inclination to understand that life is "a good to be pursued" and that which is contrary to it "a bad to be avoided" and
thus understands and affirms that the intentional destruction of
human life is a bad to be avoided.
Although the norm against killing binds without exception
for private persons, the norm is not exceptionless per se. Those
holding public authority can rightly kill the guilty with intent.
But this raises a problem. If human reason naturally apprehends
human life as good and what is contrary to it as bad, how can it
ever be legitimate to intend the destruction of human life? I will
examine three arguments of Aquinas.
II.

AN ARISTOTELIAN MODEL OF COMMUNITY

Aquinas' principal argument stems from the Aristotelian
premise that the good of a part is subordinate to the good of its
corresponding whole, as imperfect is ordered to perfect. 7 If the
health of a body is in danger on account of some serious disease,
say because of a diseased and gangrenous limb, it not only legitimate, but praiseworthy and life-giving to cut away that limb for
the sake of the whole body. In a similar way the good of any
single member of the community is subordinated to the good of
the whole community. Therefore when a member becomes
gravely dangerous to the welfare of the whole community on
account of some serious sin, it is not only licit, but praiseworthy
and salubrious that he be cut off from the community by being
18
put to death.
This analogy is problematic in several respects. First, its
logic is tied to a strict correlation between the unity of a human
body and that of a human community. But the relationship
between an arm and a body is both like and unlike that of a person to his community. It is true that the good order of a community presupposes a relatively high degree of cooperation among
its members, presupposes that responsibilities and privileges are
16. Id. at q. 64, art. 6, at 1470.
17. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. 1, ch. 2, 11. 1253a18-29, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1988 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
18. SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I, supra note 2, at q. 64, art. 2, at 1467; see also
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, supranote 13, at bk. 3, pt. 2, ch. 146, no. 4, at 220-21.
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fairly distributed, tasks are faithfully fulfilled, sacrifice is
accepted, and commands are given and received. But the existence of a member of a community has meaning apart from the
whole community in a way different from a limb apart from its
body. An arm has no proper existence apart from its body, no
independent purpose, no set of duties-no life. If an arm is
amputated, no whole self-organizing individual is destroyed, no
one created in the image of God, no proper subject of divine
affection, no creature capable of knowing and loving the Lord,
no being destined "for a blissful purpose beyond the reach of
earthly misery. '"19 In other words, no whole in itself is destroyed,
only a part of a whole.
Aquinas is aware of differences that exist between these two
senses of whole. In his Commentary on the Ethics he identifies two
types of "wholes" corresponding to two senses of the term
"unity." A political community possesses a unity of order,whereas
a human body possesses also a unity "of composition, or of conjunction, or even of continuity, and according to this unity a
thing is one absolutely."2" This absolute oneness of the unity of
the human body is, it seems to me, what morally justifies deliberately harming a diseased part for the sake of the whole. The
part's being is an extension of the being of the whole and the
one cannot exist without the other. And the operations of the
one are always in some sense the operations of the other, while a
part in the former sense can have operations of its own, apart
from the whole. Notwithstanding his distinction between two
senses of unity, Aquinas still proceeds to draw his conclusion
about killing members of a community from his own conception,
not of the unity of a community but of the unity of the human
body, implying that a member's "belonging" to the community is
absolute. 2 ' His analogy breaks down at the morally relevant
point where it is supposed to show that the correspondence of
the analogized subjects are sufficiently alike to justify an act of
intentional killing. But the amputation of a diseased limb is different in a fundamental way from the killing of a criminal. When
a diseased limb is amputated, the intent is to preserve an integrated being, an absolutely unified whole, a human life, and so
we remove a part whose presence threatens this life; but in its
removing we intend neither as an end nor means the harm or
19.

SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH

IN THE MODERN

WORLD

(GAUDIUM

ET

SpEs) no. 18, at 16 (Our Sunday Visitor,

Inc. 1965) (Vatican English translation).
20. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN
1, No. 5 (C.I. Litzinger trans., Henry Regnery Co. 1964).

21.

See

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

ETHICS

I, Lect.

II-II, supra note 2, at q. 64, art. 5, at 1469.
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destruction of that, or any unified self-organizing life. The charity we owe is owed not to the limb per se, but to the whole integrated person; and charity is preserved and expressed precisely
through the limb's removal. When we kill a criminal, we intend
to preserve one whole (i.e., the life of the body politic), and to do
so we destroy another whole. One 'life' is saved through intentionally destroying another life. But here, unlike in the former
example, both lives are owed respect. Why doesn't the charity we
owe precisely to sinners forbid us from choosing this means to bring
about the good end of the defense of the community? The morally relevant features of Aquinas' analogy are not coextensive.
Removing a diseased limb is more fittingly compared with a
separation procedure rather than a killing. In this sense we
might argue that dangerous members of the community should
be cut off in the sense of being sequestered from the community,
rather than being killed.2 2 An analogy might make this clearer.
If one of two Siamese twins contracted a deadly disease that
threatened the lives of both, common morality would hardly
sanction intentionally killing the diseased member to save the
life of the other. Every effort would be made to separate the two
so that the healthy member could be free of the threat, and the
diseased member treated accordingly.
Aquinas' analogy tends to absolutize the whole with respect
to its parts. Aquinas writes, "every part naturally exists for the
sake of the whole."2 3 He continues, "every man is part of the
community, and so, as such, he belongs to the community."24
One might argue that the analogy fails because it proves too
much, that its logic justifies the killing of innocent members of
the community who are judged to be dangerous or infectious.
This, however, would not be a fair reading of Aquinas. He is
clear that the relevant sense of "dangerous and corrupting" is
what a person becomes as a result of some sin.25 And according to
Aquinas, "the killing of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the
common good, which is corrupted by sin."2 6 No, the analogy
fails not because it proves too much, but because it wrongly
describes the relationship of individuals to the state (or civil soci22.

Germain G. Grisez, Toward a Consistent Natural-LawEthics of Killing, 15

Am.J. JuRis. 67, 67-68 (1970).
23. SuMmA THEOLOGICA I1-I, supranote 2, at q. 64, art. 2, at 1467 (" Omnis
pars naturaliterest propter totum.").
24. Id. at q. 64, art. 5, at 1469 ("Quilibet homo est pars communitatis: et ita id
quod est, est communitatis.").
25. Id. at q. 64, art. 2, at 1467.
26. Id. at q. 64, art. 6, at 1470.
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ety, Aquinas' communitas), and in so doing fails to prove what
Aquinas wants it to prove.
Persons exist within a variety of communities, beginning
with the family and extending to neighborhoods, towns, church
communities, communities of common interest, and the like,
with each contributing to a person's well-being in unique and
incommensurable ways. The state is not a person's only community of association, and persons do not exist properlyfor the state.
Vatican II affirmed this when it defined the "common good" as
instrumental to the goods of persons.2 7 A person's communal
life does not even reach its most complex at the level of the state
since the claims of the international community make themselves
known today in the lives of individuals and intermediate associations even more than they did in Aquinas' time. Moreover, intermediate communities provide real goods that the state is quite
incompetent to provide, for example, administering the sacraments and preaching the Gospel. And for believers, communal
relations and dependencies transcend the earthly community
altogether to include members of the heavenly community and
the souls in Purgatory. The role of the individual relative to civil
society is one of citizen, in the capacities of taxpayer, voter, soldier, etc., while civil society's role relative to individuals and
mediating communities is one of providing social needs that cannot reasonably be met by smaller communities.
III.

GRAvE

SIN AND FALLING FROM

HUMAN

DIGNITY

Aquinas confronts the objection raised above, which he
poses as follows: it is never legitimate to choose evil, even if it
promises great good; but killing a man is evil since we are bound
to love all men, even sinners; killing the guilty for the sake of the
common good, therefore, is never legitimate. Aquinas replies as
follows:
By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and
therefore falls away from human dignity, in so far as man is
naturally free and exists for his own sake, and falls somehow into the slavery of the beasts, so that he may be dis27. "[I]nterdependence [between nations] . . . is leading to an increasingly universal common good, the sum total of the conditions of social life enabling groups and individuals to realise their perfection more fully and readily
SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN
....
THE WORLD OF TODAY (GAUDIUM ET SPES) no. 26, in II DECREES OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCILS 1084 (Norman P. Tanner ed., 1990). "And the common good

comprises the sum of the conditions of social life which enable individuals, families and associations to reach their own perfection more completely and more
readily." Id. at no. 74, at 1121.
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posed of according to what is useful to others ....
Therefore, although it be evil in itself to kill a man who
preserves his human dignity, nevertheless to kill a man who
is a sinner can be good, just as it can be good to kill a beast;
for an evil man is worse than a beast.2 8
Aquinas says it is wrong in itself to kill someone who preserves human dignity. But grave sinners by their freely chosen
sin fall from human dignity (decidit a dignitate humana) into the
slavery of beasts and therefore may be treated according to what
is useful (utile) to others, which includes intentionally killing
them. This is an extraordinary assertion: if one preserves human
dignity the norm against killing him binds without exception; if
one loses human dignity he may rightly be killed. The phrase
"fall away from human dignity" deserves deeper consideration.
For Aquinas to refer to the dignity of a thing normally
means to refer to its intrinsic goodness: "dignity signifies the
goodness of something according to itself (i.e., for its own
sake)."29 Human dignity, therefore, refers to the intrinsic goodness human persons have by virtue of being human persons. A
human person is a unified and active subject constituted by a
material body and a rational immaterial soul.30 Human nature,
therefore, is a bodily rational nature and this nature is the subject of human dignity." And since one's nature cannot be lost,
neither can one's dignity.3 2 This prompts a question: if the subject of human dignity requires respect, and respect implies not
being intentionally killed, then why isn't killing a sinner a violation of intrinsic human dignity? If the "human dignity" to which
Aquinas refers here is not that which arises from human nature,
what other plausible sense might be given to the term? Perhaps
28.

29.

II-II, supra note 2, at q. 64, art. 2, at 1467.
"Quia dignitas significat bonitatem alicujus prpter seipsum." THOMAS
SUMMA THEOLOGICA

AQUINAS, Commentum in Tertium Librum Sententiarum, in

OPERA OMNIA,

bk. 3, d.

35, q. 1, art. 4, sol. 1c. (Musurgia Publishers 1948).
30. The rational soul is the substantial form of a person and, as such, is
necessarily corporeal: "Therefore, corporeity, as the substantial form in man,
cannot be other than the rational soul, which requires in its own matter the
possession of three dimensions, for the soul is the act of a body." SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, supra note 14, at bk. 4, ch. 81, no. 7, at 303.
31. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q. 29, art. 3, at 158 (Fathers
of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947) ("And because
to subsist in a rational nature is of great dignity, therefore every individual of a
rational nature is called a person.") (emphasis in original) [hereinafter SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE I].

32. POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE no. 9, at 24 (St. Paul Books &
Media 1995) ("Not even a murderer loses his personal dignity.").
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an answer can be found in Aquinas' discussion of how the image
of God (imago Dei) is found in the human person.
God's image, he says, is manifest in man through human
rational nature, which most closely resembles God when it
3
understands and loves God himself." We can identify therefore
"three ways" it exists in man: first, it exists in all men inasmuch as
all have the natural capacity to know and love God; second, it
exists in the just for the just actually know and love God, albeit
imperfectly; and third, it exists most perfectly in the blessed since
34
the blessed have been perfected in knowing and loving God.
Each could be referred to as an expression of human dignity
inasmuch as each corresponds to a level of relatedness to God,
the second alone being alienable. Is it plausible that Aquinas'
phrase "falling away from human dignity" might refer to the dignity that sinners fall from by virtue of ceasing to do just actions?
Is this the dignity which when fallen from makes it legitimate to
be the subject of intentional killing, but when preserved makes it
always wrong? It is possible but unlikely.
First, Aquinas states clearly that the proper sense of how the
image of God is said to subsist in humanity is by reason of human
rational nature.15 Second, the three expressions, Aquinas says,
in man, the
proceed from the single way God's image subsists
36 Aquinas is clear
way in which God's image "chiefly consists."
that this is by reason of human rational nature. The "three ways"
refer to modes of expression of that image, ways the image imitates God, but ways which are merely "accidental" expressions,
i.e., functions of God's divine image in man." "These," Aquinas
says, "do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine
image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in
the intellectual nature."3 8 Although one by sinning can fall from
justice, and hence from the dignity that is rightly attributed to
the just, one does not fall from human nature, the source of
33. SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, supra note 31, at q. 93, art. 4, at 471.
34. Id. at q. 93, art. 4, at 471-72.
35. Id. at 471.
36. SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, supra note 31, at q. 93, art. 3, at 471 ("We may
speak of God's image in two ways: first, we may consider in it that in which the
image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature.").
37. Aquinas also said:
Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its
accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of
God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from
God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole
body, and again ....
38.

Id.
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human dignity, and the source from which the three accidental
sources derive. Dignity as justice is derivative, not primary. But if
basic human dignity is preserved, even in guilt, then the objection still stands that killing a man, even a sinner, is doing evil for
the sake of good.
Aquinas seems to approach a reply to this objection when he
says, "considering a man in himself (secundum se), it is never legitimate to kill him because in every man, even in a sinner, we
ought to love the nature which God has made, which through
killing is destroyed." 9 But then he adds that when we consider a
man in relation to something else (per comparationem ad aliud), in
the case of a sinner, in relation to the common good, his slaying
becomes lawful since the common good is corrupted by sin.4" But
this begs the question we are trying to answer. What now makes it
lawful? Why when we move from considering one in himself to
considering one in relation to the community does intentional
killing become lawful? Is the act no longer the intentional destruction of the good of human life? No, the object of the act is still
the same. Does a grave sinner become less human and hence
less due charity? No, Aquinas says clearly that "sinners do not
cease to be human, since sin does not do away with nature," and
sinners therefore "ought to be loved out of charity."4 1 But if they
ought to be loved out of charity, why can public authority kill
them? Since a sinner's nature does not change when we go from

considering him secundum se to considering him per comparationem

ad aliud, only our perspective, why does his nature not still claim
from us the same measure of charity? However "decidit a dignitate
humana"is understood, the effect is that one who before sinning
was to be treated "according to himself' (propter seipsum), may
now be treated "utile" (according as he is useful to others)42

Moreover, if we grant the premise that a grave sinner falls
from human dignity, we find the argument proves too much. If
the kind of sin is mortal sin, every one who commits mortal sin
may rightly be killed as a beast. But Aquinas imposes two conditions. He says first that not every mortal sin is rightly punished by
death, but only sin that inflicts "irreparable harm" or that contains some "horrible deformity,"4 and second there must be a
greater likelihood that the sinner will harm others in the future
39. SUMMA THEOLOGICA 11-11, supra note 2, at q. 64, art. 6, at 1470.
40. Id.
41. Id. at q. 25, art. 6, at 1290.
42. Id. at q. 64, art. 2, ad 3, at p. 1467.
43. Id. at q. 66, art. 6, at 1480 ("irreparabile nocumentum" or "horribilem
deformitatem").
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than mend his ways. 44 But if the criterion for losing dignity is
intrinsic to the sinful act's relation to the order of reason, then
the added criteria are arbitrary. If the criterion for losing dignity
depends on ajudge's or jury's judgment that the relative gravity
of a particular crime is warranting of death, then human dignity
is relative to a juridical judgment. Aquinas' logic says, in effect,
that many more people are suited to be killed (by virtue of their
beastly status) than may rightly (juridically speaking) be killed.
I have argued that Aquinas' answers to the question as to
why it is legitimate for public authority to kill criminals are
flawed and question-begging, flawed insofar as they presume a
faulty notion of the relationship between individuals and civil
society, and question-begging to the extent that they fail to reply
to the objection that killing sinners is doing evil for the sake of
good. Does Aquinas provide any other argument for the death
penalty that might overcome these objections? His conception
of the attribution of responsibility by subordinates to lawful
authority should be explored.
IV.

AUTHORITY AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

Aquinas has argued that with respect to a system of law that
includes within its range of punishments the punishment of
death, public authority and public authority alone judges guilt,
45
sentences to death, and carries out the killing. This prerogative stems from public authority's responsibility to be guardian of
the common good and to exercise its authority in all ways necessary for carrying out that responsibility. How does this exonerate
public officials from the charge that this particular means,
because of its object, is never lawful? Following Pseudo
Dionysius46 and Augustine,4 7 Aquinas argues that the person by
whose authority a thing is done is really the one who does that
thing, while the one who carries out the command is no more
than an instrument, as a sword is an instrument in the hand of a
soldier.4" The executioner therefore does not properly speaking
49
do the killing, but rather the judge by whose authority he acts.
Since the authority to punish ultimately derives from God, by
Id. at q. 25, art. 6, at 1290.
Id. at q. 64, art. 3 at 1467.
See Pseudo Dionysis, The Celestial Hierarchy III, in PSEUDO DIoNYSlS:
THE COMPLETE WORKS (Colim Luibheid trans., 1987).
47. See SAINT AUGUSTINE, DE CVITATE DEi 36-37 (J.E.C. Welldon ed., Soc.
for Promoting Christian Knowledge 1924).
48. SuMMA THEOLOGICA I-I, supranote 2, at q. 64, art. 3, ad 1 at 1467-68.
49. Id. at q. 64, art. 3, at 1467-68; see also SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, supra
note 13, at bk. 3, pt. 1, ch. 76, no. 6, at 256.
44.
45.
46.
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whose providence the good are rewarded and evil are punished,
and whose authority extends to all things necessary to preserve
the common good,5 ° public officials, acting on behalf of a system
of order, whose authority derives ultimately from God, may rightfully kill criminals: such officials "do no wrong when they reward
the good and punish the evil." 51 It seems to follow that in
inflicting capital punishments, public officials do not actually do
the killing but rather it is done by God by whose authority they
act. If God and not the human instrument bears responsibility,
the question of whether the intentional killing chosen is chosen
wrongly is abrogated, since what is otherwise forbidden to men is
not forbidden to God, who, as Lord of life and death, slays the
guilty and righteous alike.5 2 Would this conclusion be acceptable to Aquinas? It seems unlikely.
When Aquinas argues for the legitimacy of capital punishment, he invariably appeals to the relationship that exists
between a part and its corresponding whole, and to the existential effects of grave sin on sinners. He does apply his principle of
the attribution of responsibility to capital punishment (for example, he asserts that an executioner slays by the judge's authority)," but never in relation to God and civil authority, that is, he

never asserts that public authority, or the judge, slays by God's
authority. 4 When he does attribute responsibility for killing to
God, it is not in regard to the killing that takes place within the
criminal justice system, but rather, in each case, to killing
ordered by God by divine command: those "who slew their neighbors and friends by the mandate of the Lord [see Exodus 32:27],
would seem not to have done this themselves, but it was done
rather by him by whose authority they did it." 5 Aquinas continues, "he who by a command of God kills the innocent, such a
man does not sin, just as God does not sin, Whose executor the
man is." 5 6 And again:
Abraham, when he consented to slay his son, did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be killed by the
command of God, who is Lord of life and death: for he it is
50.
at 220.
51.
52.

SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES,

supra note 13, at bk. 3, pt. 2, ch. 146, no. 4,

Id.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I, supra note 2, at q. 64, art. 6, at 1470.
53. Id.
54. He does appeal to the authority of God to ground the prerogative of
public authority to determine (determinationem) who should and should not be
punished. See SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, supra note 6, at q. 100, art. 8, at 1046.
55. SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, supra note 2, at q. 64, art. 3, at 1468.
56. Id. at q. 64, art. 6, at 1470.
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who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, just and
unjust.., and if a man be the executor of that sentence by
divine authority, he will be no more a murderer than God
would be.5 7
Aquinas does hold that the powers of public authority derive
from God, but he does not go to the next step and justify state
killing by attributing the killing to God. For Aquinas, the state is
authorized to kill and the state does the killing. And such killing
is legitimate for two reasons: (1) because a grave sinner constitutes a serious threat to the welfare of the community of which
he is a part, and (2) because in sinning decidit a dignitate humana.
There is little in Aquinas to suggest that in the absence of the
soundness of these two foundational arguments, he would
defend state sanctioned killing on the strength of his principle of
attribution alone.
In conclusion, Aquinas' defense of capital punishment by
legitimate authority fails to overcome a number of criticisms.
First, that the killing of criminals is doing evil so that good may
come. The human dignity proper to all persons is inalienable,
stemming as it does from the very nature of the human person.
If killing oneself is contrary to the charity we owe ourselves, and
killing our neighbor is contrary to the charity we owe our neighbors, then killing a criminal is contrary to the charity we owe to
criminals. No appeal to fallen human dignity or the exigencies
of the common good can change the nature of the act, which
from its object (ex objecto) aims to destroy the intrinsic good of
human life. Moreover, Aquinas' argument from the relationship
of a part to its corresponding whole tends to absolutize the
power of the community over the individual, a tendency which
would not necessarily be problematic if the operative analogy
correctly described the relationship of an individual to the state.
But the strict correlation between a person's relationship to the
community and a limb's relationship to the human body is faulty.
Human persons are born into, act, interact, and find fulfillment
in a variety of communities prior to and more basic than the civil
community; in other words, persons can and do have life apart
from the state. A human limb, on the other hand, is integral to,
organically part of, and absolutely dependent upon and
subordinate in function to the good of the human body of which
it is a part. To amputate a gangrenous and moribund limb is not
strictly analogous to killing a fully alive, albeit wicked, human
person.
57.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, supra note 6, at q. 100, art. 8, at 1046.
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If my conclusions are correct about the plausibility of Aquinas' traditional argument, then the rational foundation of the
traditional Catholic philosophical defense of the death penalty
loses its primary support, which raises the unavoidable question
as to whether the death penalty ought to be opposed in
principle.

